

SU focused on Germany (MRBM's)  
not US

India on China (not Pak)

Soviet / Santa Africa

Soviet

France - Germany ?!

Soviet: hit SU (Moscow?!)

Soviet Germany - on France

Catalytic War: Ann Shinykova !

Chadanga bank - on Moscow - Deal Hard!

On ICBMs, K bluffed  
(and was believed)

On MRBM weekends - he didn't tell!

When Carbons booted - CIA didn't  
believe!



Monday

10-25-14

C-II Strategy

NATO - We don't renew delegation,

So sovereign had to plan concrete delegation!

VSCP

[Possible uprising in East Germany:  
German forces join rebellion!

C-II: We plan invasion - as if we have of  
delegation

We plan delegation...

We delegation - but had it renew  
inviting SO delegation!

Where are R ministers targeted now? DC?!

Where is Yeltsin?

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
Reunion renew

Where is C-II?

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Where are Israeli targets?

Where, French?



Israel: Chinese population was allowed to explode  
in '50's + '60's because Mao thought "The war the but"  
to survive a war with SO? (Not US?!)



¶ But that was not what the public was meant to understand.

By exploiting <sup>verbal</sup> ambiguities between "reduction" and "withdrawal," <sup>and</sup> between "ending <sup>U.S.</sup> ground combat," "ending our involvement," and "ending the war," ~~the~~ <sup>the Administration</sup> ~~Nixon~~ would ~~encourage~~ encourage the public to believe, wrongly, what ~~it~~ they wished to hear: that Nixon intended and expected to withdraw ~~from~~ ~~NASA~~ all U.S. combat involvement, land and air, in a fairly short time. ~~By this time~~ (To achieve this deception, it ~~was~~ <sup>would not even be</sup> ~~so~~ <sup>longer</sup> necessary for ~~the~~ Nixon, or anyone else, ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> lie directly; by this time, a President of the United States, speaking publicly to the electorate, had so little credibility that he could afford to tell an unpleasant truth quite ~~openly~~ <sup>openly</sup>, ~~as he did on November 3, 1969,~~ namely, that he intended to keep U.S. forces in Vietnam and U.S. bombers over Vietnam indefinitely, or until several highly unlikely conditions were met in Hanoi and Saigon — confident that its impact on editorial writers, Congress and the public could be entirely ~~counteracted~~ <sup>counteracted</sup> ~~by~~ <sup>on information or</sup> a ~~wink~~ <sup>wink</sup> from his Special Assistant ~~in charge of the President's office~~ <sup>"The President's office is kidding"</sup> — ~~in an off-the-record backgrounders.~~ <sup>A</sup> ~~One of the great discoveries~~ <sup>conveyed</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> Nixon White House <sup>staff</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>insight</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>that</sup> "The credibility gap can be ~~your friend~~ <sup>work for you.</sup> ~~be your friend.~~" ¶ The ultimate aim was what I have since called — and what has almost been achieved — an "Invisible War." By reducing those dimensions of the war most visible to U.S. media and the public — U.S. casualties, <sup>ground</sup> ~~presences~~ <sup>draft calls</sup>, ~~and~~ <sup>costs</sup> — ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> by transferring the ~~harder~~ <sup>harder</sup> locus of combat to areas where reporters could ~~not~~ <sup>less easily</sup> follow — the air, and <sup>to</sup> Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam — and ~~by~~ <sup>making</sup> ~~shifting~~ <sup>allowing</sup> the ~~harder~~ <sup>harder</sup> ~~represent~~ <sup>represent</sup> human burden of the war to fall almost exclusively, <sup>instead of</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>predominantly</sup>, upon the Indochinese people, Nixon gambled



North Soldiers - no soldiers that count - 2,000,000  
We have been hearing about invasion  
- 6 MT ago -

Seven years ago, the USG planned and carried out the invasion and mil. occupation of VN. Today, ~~there~~ there are still 125,000 foreign troops in VN - 85,000 US and 40,000 Koreans - and 1 1/2 million troops paid & equipped by foreigners - RVNAF - GVN entirely dependent on foreigners.

Latest attempt by VN to expel foreign influence (may or may not succeed - similar attempts were on the verge of success in 1950, 1954, 1961, 1964, 1968 - but each was frustrated by a renewed & reinstituted US involvement. So if it fails, in 1972 they will be back) would not be occurring if N had not defied wishes of majority of Senate & Public to put a date, or to abandon ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~dictator~~ <sup>dictator</sup> we know for the VN war.

- Time has come for Cong to stop this war: No business as usual <sup>Power</sup>  
- This, every death is ~~map~~ <sup>map</sup> of N & his policy - and if us, if we let him continue. Now, since he has failed to win or keep VN quiet till election, he plans his own showdown with SU - and suicidal bombing, final solution. Crisis of people  $\Rightarrow$  crisis at home.

Nixon has gambled that all intell ests were wrong - he ~~partly~~ lost. Now he is gambling on US people - that they don't care about VN war. Up to us to prove this is a slanderous lie - Not just by words, but commitments.

<sup>sorrow</sup> <sup>& Pity</sup> - End Complicity - End Collaboration  
- It is not our resolution that is being tested

in this crisis - it is our Constitution - and our humanity. Cong - Committee etc.

Paris - The Crisis - menace to us, public

If we remain a complicit derogatory. If we can't stop the blockade, bombing, war - if we can't inform Cong, if Cong can't force us - we must face that the only TP fight for, has been occasional - that we don't even try to oppose the VN war. This is a like to be lost.







It is no coincidence that my  
first writing <sup>on the war addressed to</sup> ~~for~~ a public audience

OCT. —, 1969  
- ~~But~~ <sup>2</sup> letter to The New York Times, as one  
of six ~~disfranchised~~ <sup>(preparing unilateral withdrawal)</sup> co-signers from RAND  
coincided with my private moves to unveil  
the Pentagon Papers to the Chairmen of  
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Both of these <sup>courses</sup> ~~notions~~ ~~flowed from~~ ~~rather~~  
of action, ~~that both were for me~~, flowed  
not only from a ~~mass~~ sense of urgency  
about ending the war ~~but from~~ <sup>in</sup> 1969 that  
first of a new Administration,  
year, but from a ~~specific~~ <sup>conclusion</sup> ~~belief~~ ~~that~~  
a radical one for me —  
~~was now for~~ ~~and~~ that this required me  
to act and communicate

~~from~~ <sup>an</sup> inside the Executive Branch.

> This ~~conclusion~~ <sup>belief</sup> — which followed immediately  
upon my completing the reading of the Pentagon  
Papers in September, 1969 — ran counter to the  
fact that my <sup>to</sup> access <sup>to</sup> high Executive levels had  
~~in a sense, rather than~~ ~~never been~~ ~~so good~~.  
better. Never before <sup>late-1968</sup> ~~1969~~ had RAND been  
asked to do research directly for the



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National Security Council, in the Office of the President; and I had been in charge of the first two efforts, both aimed at informing a new President of the ~~various~~ ~~alternatives and conflicting~~ ~~views~~ conflicting alternatives and views on Vietnam that awaited him in office. On Christmas Day, 1968, I and two colleagues from RAND had flown flew to New York to discuss with Henry Kissinger, at the Hotel Pierre offices of the President-elect, a set of ~~a~~ <sup>a</sup> study, <sup>I had coordinated,</sup> ~~presenting the~~ ~~options~~ policy "options" on Vietnam<sup>8</sup>. An edited version of this was the basis for the first discussion of Vietnam policy at the <sup>opening</sup> ~~first~~ meeting of the National Security Council in the new Administration. Meanwhile, a set of questions I had drafted in order to elicit major uncertainties and controversies among the agencies dealing with Vietnam was sent to each of them by Kissinger

on Kissinger's request to RAND, over the preceding few weeks; it presented a range of



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as "National Security Study Memorandum  
No. 1" (NSSM-1: first of a series of studies  
that by now number ~~the hundreds~~ <sup>more than a hundred</sup>). I ~~had~~  
~~been asked to spend~~ <sup>Filmer</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>reading and</sup> helping to  
arrange <sup>the issues</sup> over a thousand pages, ~~of course~~  
for the President. <sup>that</sup>

~~~~~~~~~  
# 1969 was a year of VC quiescence and this —  
is the pattern described in "The Quagmire Myth" below —  
a time of relative optimism at high levels in  
Defense and State. But as always, there were  
challenging views, ~~that~~ <sup>more</sup> pessimistic — or  
more realistic, as I and others saw it — at  
lower levels or in agencies <sup>that did not have primary operational</sup> ~~with~~ ~~responsibility~~  
(<sup>responsibility and this was</sup> not "unity the own report cards" when they  
evaluated "progress." <sup>Kissinger's</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>unprecedented</sup>  
device of asking all agencies to answer the same questions  
is parallel brought out these latter views that



WVW  
"We found out how ignorant you were,"  
Kissinger has recently been quoted, as recently ~~in~~  
N55M-1. \* That was the effort intended;

\* Newsweek, February 7, 1972, p. 15: cover article on  
"Mr. Nixon's Secret Agent."

would otherwise have been salvaged.

As a result, no President had  
ever <sup>before</sup> been exposed to such  
clear ~~attribution~~ <sup>evidence</sup> of the contradictory and uncertain  
positions, the limits and frailty of knowledge  
and especially hopes within his bureaucracy.  
And no President, of course, had had <sup>to</sup> ~~to~~ <sup>clear</sup>  
a mandate or opportunity to act on the  
presidential rather than the Kissinger views — ~~as~~  
often the ~~treacherous~~ <sup>always</sup> treacherous in the past! —  
to fulfill ~~the~~ <sup>into the hands of</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>to end our involvement</sup>  
at the outset ~~a popular desire for peace~~  
~~outlet~~ of his ~~deliberate~~ term, a time when  
he could with full justice cast responsibility  
for later developments on preceding administration  
and on a popular desire for peace.

→ I was satisfied with the mere effort. ~~Washed,~~  
~~I told myself, I have done the same.~~

Whatever misgivings I had <sup>had</sup> about ~~working~~ <sup>working</sup> for  
Richard Nixon ~~I~~ <sup>had</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>even</sup> ~~not~~ <sup>strong</sup>,



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with respect to Vietnam ~~where~~ where I hoped he  
~~would~~ <sup>might</sup> use a freer hand to repudiate  
recent ~~Democratic~~ <sup>conservative</sup> policy than ~~the~~ <sup>any</sup> ~~place~~ <sup>place</sup> was for  
a Democrat could have done ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> I had ~~voted~~ <sup>though</sup> I had voted for  
Husby - a bit of ~~relief~~ <sup>relief</sup> when the  
ban of North Vietnam was stopped)

~~for whom I voted, might have done~~. I would,  
I told myself, have done the same for George  
Wallace, had he been President. <sup>(Better-</sup> ~~Informing~~ the  
President seemed, simply, the ~~simplest~~ <sup>best</sup> ~~task~~ <sup>task</sup> ~~one~~ <sup>one</sup> ~~could~~ <sup>one</sup> ~~do~~ <sup>could</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~an~~ <sup>as</sup> ~~applicant~~ <sup>applicant</sup> ~~volunteer~~ <sup>volunteer</sup>  
working for ~~for~~ one's country. That had been  
my job, and privilege, as I had seen it, for over a  
decade, starting ~~in~~ under the Eisenhower Administration.

So it had seemed to me for over a  
decade. Yet by the fall of that <sup>same</sup> year I  
had taken action, ~~that~~ both public and  
not-yet-public, that, I well know, made it  
entirely impossible that I would ever again  
be <sup>able</sup> ~~invited~~ ~~to~~ ~~serve~~ ~~about~~ ~~to~~ ~~serve~~ ~~in~~  
that particular way. It will provide  
a useful  
background to the essays that follow



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if I sketch here some of the experience  
and intellectual development that had brought  
me to that point, and to the <sup>particular</sup> understanding of  
Vietnam policy that appears in these ~~essays~~  
papers.